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ABSTRACT
Putnam's theory "two-level games" has spawned numerous studies examining the
interaction between international and domestic politics, many focusing on politics in the European
Union.  While noting that ratification may be formal or informal, much of this literature treats
each important domestic actor as if it has de facto formal ratification power.  This means that the
literature overlooks the very real distinction between formal and informal ratification.  Informal
ratification may be thought of as a case in which the government pays "audience costs" for
unpopular international agreements.  In this case, a government must respond continuously to
public opinion.  This presents constraints very different from those faced by governments who
must obtain the formal approval of a legislature (or other actor).  For example, divided
government has no effect on the likelihood of informal ratification but does affect the distribution
of gains, while it often affects the likelihood of formal ratification but has no effect on the
distribution fo the gains in many cases.  Because these kinds of ratification differ significantly,
Putnam's ratification metaphor is not always the most appropriate conceptualization of two-level
politics in the European Union.2
Through its many stops and starts, the process of European integration has clearly
depended on the relationships between different institutions and groups within the European
polity.  The European Commission, and to a lesser extent the national governments, serves as the
motor force for European integration.  National publics, and to a lesser extent the legislatures,
serve as the brakes.  In short, certain elites negotiate proposals for further integration subject to
constraints placed on them by other actors.
Our theoretical understanding of this process is unnecessarily limited.  The dominant
approach is heavily influenced by Robert Putnam’s (1988) metaphor of “two-level games.” 
Putnam conceptualized international cooperation as carried out by a country’s executives, who
played one “game” with their foreign counterparts and a second game with domestic political
actors at home.  His framework highlighted the interaction between domestic and international
politics within a theoretically-manageable framework, and it sparked a very fruitful research
agenda studying both the United States and the European Union.
Subsequent research has tended to bifurcate into a formal literature limited to the problem
of domestic ratification of treaties (without amendment) and a nonformal literature in which all
processes other than formal ratification is labeled “informal ratification” and then treated as
conceptually similar to the formal variant.  Each literature has made progress on its piece of the
problem.  Yet clearly there is room for formalization of other types of domestic political settings,
both to expand the formal literature and to add rigor to the nonformal analysis of some recurring
types of political interactions.
This paper develops a way to characterize some informal ratification games formally,
especially those in which domestic public opinion provides the major constraint on the executive’s3
actions.  I begin with the well-understood formal ratification problem and then show how informal
ratification differs from the standard formal ratification game.  The analysis leaves out some other
types of domestic political constraints, such as no-confidence votes, elections, and imperfect
implementation, but still suffices to capture a wide range of two-level problems.
With formal ratification, the executive’s task centers on making the ratifier prefer an
agreement to the status quo.  The ratifier’s choice is dichotomous, to ratify or not.  This
dichotomous choice produces an environment in which the ratifier’s preferences have
dichotomous effects: sometimes they constrain and sometimes they do not.  Once the ratifier is
satisfied, the executive does not need to make further concessions to it.
In contrast, informal ratification provides a continuous constraint on the executive.  While
the executive can pursue her own preferences, she must always “tack” in the direction of public
opinion.  Depending on how much she values public opinion, this informal ratification may cause
a larger or smaller change in the agreements that an executive negotiates.  However, the public is
never completely satisfied and can never simply be ignored as some formal ratifiers can be.  
The importance of these different domestic processes is especially evident in the European
Union.  Large package deals, such as the Maastricht, Amsterdam or Nice treaties, only become
law after obtaining the formal approval of one or more actors at the national political level.  The
relevant actor may one or both houses of the legislature, a public referendum, or even all of the
above, depending on country (see Hug and König 2002).  Many other decisions do not require
domestic ratification, from annual price setting in the Common Agricultural Policy to major policy
coordination or joint decisions in the Common Foreign and Security Policy.  The major constraint
in these latter cases is the potential wrath of domestic public opinion, an informal ratification
process.   4
In short, the implications of domestic opposition to any EU policy will depend,
systematically and predictably, on whether ratification is formal or informal.  Understanding the
role of democratic governance in the European Union, as well as evaluating any democratic
deficit, requires examining both formal and informal processes.
Two-level games and the European Union
To analyze the problem of how domestic ratification affects policy making, I will join
many others in using a spatial model of two-level games.  Robert Putnam (1988) developed his
theory of two-level games at a time when many scholars were dissatisfied with the sterile
distinction between the international and domestic levels of analysis (for contemporaneous efforts,
see Ikenberry et al. 1988; Mastanduno et al. 1989; Haggard 1990; for a review, see Moravcsik
1991).  Putnam’s metaphor proved the most popular for a variety of reasons, and soon sparked a
large literature studying many countries, mostly but not entirely in the developed world (Barnett
1990; Avery, ed. 1993; Evans et al., eds. 1993; Friman 1993; Hammond and Prins 1998; Li 1994;
Lohmann 1992; Iida 1993a, 1993b; Lehman and McCoy 1992; Mayer 1993; McGinnis and
Williams 1993; Meunier 1995; Milner 1997; Milner and Rosendorff 1996, 1997; Mo 1994a,
1994b, 1995; Morrow 1991, 1997; Putnam and Bayne 1987; Putnam and Henning 1986; Rapkin
and George 1993; Smith 1998; Schoppa 1993; Solingen 1993).  The fact that Putnam had used a
simple version of spatial theory in explicating his framework also proved influential, and has
shaped much of the subsequent research in both the formal and non-formal literatures.
  Putnam argued that we should think of policy-makers as playing two games, a “Level I”
international game with one another and a “Level II” ratification game with domestic
constituencies.  Both the likelihood of cooperation, and the distribution of gains when cooperation5
occurs, depends on each executive’s success in playing these two games simultaneously.
Putnam’s point of reference was clearly the United States, in which an elected President
negotiates treaties subject to approval by a two-thirds majority of an independently-elected Senate. 
Extending it to parliamentary systems in which the parliament chooses the executive raises
significant challenges, not always recognized (see Pahre 1997).  Organized interest groups, which
also play a role in the United States different than their role in many other democracies, have
provided an important focus for many studies of “informal” ratification as well as studies of how
interest groups influence legislative ratification (i.e., Crombez 2002; Milner 1997).
The European Union has proved to be a fruitful subject for this kind of two-level analysis
(Hug and König 1999; König and Hug 1997, 2000; König and Pöter 2001; Milner 1997: Chapter
8; Moyer 1993; Pahre 1997, 2001; Schneider 1993, 2000; Schneider and Cederman 1994). 
Timing probably explains part of this success, since the European Union’s straddling of
international and domestic politics fits traditional academic boundaries rather poorly.  The
complexity of the multilevel process in the European Union also called out for an analytical
framework capable of handling interactions between distinct political realms (cf. König et al., eds.
1996).
Two-level studies tend to focus either on the interstate negotiation phase (Level I) or the
domestic approval phase (Level II), though studies of either type naturally exploit the interactive
and synergistic strengths inherent in the two-level framework.  Aside from the contributors to the
Double-Edged Diplomacy project (Evans et al. eds. 1993), which mostly emphasized the Level I
game, the Level II game has attracted the most attention in European Union studies.  Scholars
have applied the Level II ratification game to the European Union in two ways.  One group, best
exemplified by a series of papers by Simon Hug, Thomas König, and others (Hug and König6
1999; König and Hug 1997, 2000; König and Pöter 2001), represent efforts to determine exactly
who veto players are, under exactly what rules, in particular countries at particular times.
A second group uses the Level II ratification game more loosely to examine domestic
constraints on political action.  For example, Helen Milner (1997: Chapter 8) uses a ratification
model to look at ratification of the Maastricht treaty in Britain, France, and Germany, though
ratification was not formally required in any of the three.  In this her study resembles many others,
examining a range of countries, that treat domestic groups as exercising informal influence over
the preferences of negotiators.  Examples include agricultural interests in Japan, financial interests
in Brazil, the military in Argentina and Brazil (Lehman and McCoy 1992; Rapkin and George
1993; Solingen 1993).
Current theory treats all these forms of domestic approval as essentially similar, in which
domestic actors “ratify” decisions negotiated by foreign policy makers (Putnam 1988).  Virtually
all of these treat the domestic political game as a ratification problem in which the government
must receive some actor's formal approval before an international agreement takes effect.  The
literature notes a distinction in principle between formal ratification and more informal forms of
approval, but treats them as analytically similar. 
This paper presents two related models that make a clear analytic distinction between
formal and informal ratification.  Formal ratification presents some decision-makers with a
dichotomous strategy space, giving them the choice of either accepting or rejecting a treaty.  This
results in discontinuities in the choices of other actors.  Specifically, an executive need only make
concessions to a legislature or other ratifier if an agreement’s passage would otherwise be in
doubt.
Informal ratification produces a continuous strategy space.  Public opinion, interest groups,7
and other “ratifiers” may make slight changes in their support of the executive in response to small
changes in the agreement.  As a result, executives will make concessions to informal ratifiers
throughout the entire range of political support, and not just when an agreement is in danger of
rejection.
This institutional difference plays a critical role: with the same actors and identical
preferences, agreement may be possible under informal ratification but impossible under formal
ratification.  The institutional difference also has behavioral implications for how a negotiator will
view her domestic political problem, and how she will change agreements in response. 
Though I emphasize the differences between formal and informal ratification, certainly
many executives face both problems.  A legislature may have formal ratification authority over a
treaty, while an executive may also worry about public opinion’s informal reactions in advance of
parliamentary elections.  The analysis here allows a straightforward synthesis of the two problems.
As the forgoing discussion suggests, this paper is purely analytical and theoretical, without
a systematic effort to test the theory.  The goal is to provide propositions about formal and
informal ratification games in a format that could be tested empirically, either quantitatively or in
case studies.  I also emphasize those propositions that distinguish the two games from each other.
Framework for formal analysis
To model institutional differences, it is helpful to have a very simple, flexible model of
two-level games.  For this, I assume that governments jointly choose a point ("policy") in n-
dimensional policy space.  As in other spatial models, each actor has an ideal point, which
represents that actor's most-preferred point in policy space.  Governments may have preferences8
over policy that differ from society's preferences.  Each actor evaluates policies by their distance
from her ideal.  The models here use a quadratic loss function in which utility goes down with the
square of the distance between an actor’s ideal point and the point being evaluate.
The solution concept is the win-set, the set of points that are possible outcomes of the
bargaining game between the governments when they take ratification needs into account.  At
times I will also analyze the "intergovernmental win-set," the set of points that the governments
might choose if no ratification were required.  Because Putnam did not clearly distinguish
executive and ratifier preferences, both definitions differ slightly from his, though my definitions
are broadly consistent with the rest of the formal literature.  Within the win-sets, I do not solve the
obvious bargaining problem, but assume that any point within that set may be the result of
negotiations (see Hammond and Prins 1999 for a similar approach).
This paper is limited to games of complete information in order to highlight institutional
differences.  Complete information is also more tractable, and models of complete information
provide an essential prelude to the study of incomplete information.  We can only argue that
incomplete information uniquely explains ratification failures, for instance, if we know whether
ratification failures occur under complete information (for information in two-level games, see
Iida 1993a; Milner 1997; Milner and Rosendorff 1996, 1997; for a similar type of problem in the
EU, see Crombez 2002).  Extending the model here to problems of incomplete information would
provide a reasonable direction for a research agenda into informal ratification.
The formal ratification game
The two-level game that attracted most of Putnam's attention was a game in which two
governments negotiate an international agreement, subject to ratification by one or more domestic1In addition, institutional designers sometimes make rules that preclude amendment, such
as the "fast track" provisions of the US Trade Act of 1974.  Pahre (1997) has shown that when the
executive and the legislature jointly choose the institution, it is generically true that they will not
choose ratification rules that allow amendment.
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actors.  In the canonical case, an agreement will be ratified if it satisfies the median voter in the
legislature.  As Putnam forcefully argued, anticipation of the ratification stage has important
effects on the intergovernmental negotiation.
This game has several applications to the European Union.  At the Union level, the assent
procedure, which gives the European Parliament the power to accept or reject legislation (without
amendment) fits this game well.  At the national level, legislatures’ ratification of major treaties,
such as Maastricht or Nice, or the accession of new members is also well described by this game. 
Rather than explore particular applications of these procedures, this section will examine the
general case in the abstract.  
As this suggests, the exact identity of the “government” and “ratifier” may vary
considerably in the EU.  Most commonly, the Commission will be the “government” who
negotiates an agreement with outsiders, though the Council formally negotiates with outsiders in
accession and negotiates internally in the case of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP).  The ratifier may be the Council in some cases, is the European Parliament in many other
cases, and often includes national parliaments.  Excluding amendment powers does not do too
much violence to these procedures.  For example, the European Parliament has only restricted
amendment powers in the cooperation procedure (Tsebelis 1994), and (more controversially) may
have no amendment powers at all in the codecision procedure (Pollack 1999; Tsebelis and Garrett
2000 but Crombez 2002).
1  As these illustrations show, the model applies when there is no single
agenda-setter such as the European Commission, but two or more negotiators who jointly set the10
Policy is a point xdú
m, with status quo Q at xQ.
Actors are Governments A, B, and Ratifier R, with ideal points in n-dimensional space xA, xB, xR. 
Ideal points are distinct from each other and from the status quo, so that xi…xj,
œi, j 0 {A, B, R} and xi…xSQ, œi 0 {A, B, R}.
 
Outcome at end of game is xE, which will be either Q at xQ or a negotiated and ratified agreement N
at xN.  Label the set of all negotiable and ratifiable xN the "win-set," w.  I allow only
"meaningful" agreements, i.e., xN…xQ.
Utility is a quadratic loss function from ideal point, i.e., Ui(xE) = ! [d(xi -xE)]
2, i 0 {A, B, R},
xE 0 {xQ, w }.  Actor i’s acceptance set ci = {x: d(xi -xE) # d(xi -xQ) }.
Stages and outcomes:
I. Negotiation along contract curve (Putnam's Level I).  A and B jointly choose a point xN.  If either
prefers xQ to xN, then xQ results and the game ends.
II.  Ratification by R (Putnam's Level II).  R ratifies xN iff it prefers xN to xQ. If it ratifies, outcome is
xN; else xQ results.  There is no amendment at the ratification stage.
Structure of the game is complete information, and all of the above is common knowledge.
Solution:
(1)  if cA 1 cB 1 cR = i, then w = i; 
(2)  else if cA 1 cB 1 cR = cA 1 cB, then w = cA 1 cB 1 sAB;
(3)  else if cA 1 cB 1 cR 1 wG … i, then w d wG;
(4)  else, then w … i and w 1 wG = i.
GAME 1:
THE FORMAL RATIFICATION GAME
policy agenda for actors moving later in a given legislative process.
The adjacent box describes such a game.  After the governments agree, some domestic
group decides whether to ratify the agreement.  If the governments cannot agree, or if ratification
fails, the status quo ante remains.11
Figure 1
The Intergovernmental Win-Set
Figure 1 shows the
outcome of this game if
there were no ratifier.  This
intergovernmental win-set
consists of those points that
are both negotiable and
efficient.  Those points that
both governments would
accept as alternatives to the
status quo, because they are
closer to their ideal point
than is the status quo, are negotiable.  The contract curve between the two governments’ ideal
point is efficient, for there is always some point on the contract curve that both governments
prefer to any given point off the curve.  The figure shows the two ways that an intergovernmental
win-set may be bound, either by an actor’s acceptance set (as B bounds the left end) or by a
government’s ideal point.  With different locations of Q, the win-set could be bound on both sides
by the two acceptance sets or by the two ideal points.
Much of the case study literature on two-level games acts as if ratifiers are always
constraining.  However, adding a ratifier may or may not produce a result that differs from the
intergovernmental win-set:
Hypothesis 1.  There are four possible outcomes to the formal ratification game:
1a.  formal ratification may make any international agreement impossible; 
1b.  formal ratification may be irrelevant because the ratifier will accept anything the
executives might negotiate;12
Figure 2
Four Types of Win-Sets with Formal Ratification
1c. a formal ratifier may constrain the win-set, accepting some points the governments
would negotiate but rejecting others (which the governments will therefore no
longer negotiate); 
1d. a formal ratifier may shift the win-set to points off the intergovernmental win-set.
(See Proposition 1 in the Appendix for proof.)
The first case, in which ratification prevents agreement, occurs when the governments can agree
on some policy but the ratifier prefers the status quo to any such agreement.  At the other extreme,
formal ratification may be irrelevant because the ratifier will accept anything that the governments
negotiate.  Third, the ratifier may constrain the win-set because it is willing to ratify only part of
the contract curve between the two governments.  Finally, the ratifier may change the win-set: it
will ratify nothing on the governments' contract curve, but it will ratify some other points that both
governments prefer to the status quo.
Figure 2 shows the
four possibilities.  When the
ratifier is at R1, there is no
point acceptable to all three
actors.  As a result, the win-
set W1 is the status quo Q,
and policy remains
unchanged.
If we move R
southwestward, the ratifier
is now willing to accept
some change in the same direction that the two governments desire.  The governments will2I have made no assumption about which points the governments will propose.  This
particular state of affairs has sparked a debate between Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2000,
2002) and Dai (2002) over the likely outcome in a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining model.
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propose points as far as possible from the status quo,
2 yielding the arc labeled as W2.  This arc is
bounded by the lines connecting A and Q (AQ) and B and Q (BQ).  Continued movement of R2
moves the arc toward the intergovernmental win-set, and the growing arc will suddenly shrink to a
point when it touches the AB line.
Further movement will increase the number of points on the intergovernmental win-set that
the ratifier will accept.  The win-set W3 shows this case, with the right-hand bound of the win-set
the same distance from R3 as is the status quo Q.  Finally, as the ratifier moves still further it will
accept all of the points in the intergovernmental win-set.  
Finally, at R4, the win-set W4 is the same as the intergovernmental win-set.  When this
occurs, the ratifier is effectively irrelevant.
These are four, qualitatively-different outcomes, as the pictures of the win-sets suggest.  At
least under conditions of complete information, there are also sharp boundaries between these
outcomes as a point becomes an arc, then a point and then grows into a line segment.  I have
drawn the four illustrative ratifiers on a line to make visible how linear and continuous changes in
the ratifier’s preferences may have “discontinuous” and “nonlinear” qualitative changes in the
win-set.
Especially when we consider the case labeled as W4 in the figure, Hypothesis 1 also
reminds us of the important point that not all actors' preferences will be constraining.  This has
been noticed in some of the case study literature (i.e., Snyder 1993) but many others attribute
outcomes to the "ratification" requirements of many domestic groups on a single issue, regardless14
of the formal institutional requirements or precise distribution of preferences (i.e., Lehman and
McCoy 1992; Milner 1997: Chapters 7-8; Rapkin and George 1993).
There are various conditions under which the ratifier will be irrelevant.  The simplest
condition is that if A’s and B’s ideal points are both in the ratifier’s acceptance set, then the
ratifier will ratify everything on the contract curve and will therefore be irrelevant (see 81 in
appendix).  This has important behavioral implications in that the negotiator will likely ignore
domestic audiences, who can (rightly) complain about a lack of influence over the details of an
agreement.
The analysis here also has implications for the kind of ratification behavior we should
observe.  In the R2 case, the governments propose an agreement that is barely acceptable to the
ratifier.  This should mean that the agreement will be ratified by the narrowest possible margin.   
Narrowly satisfying the voters in Denmark’s second vote on the Maastricht Treaty on European
Union would probably be an example of this.  In the other cases with successful ratification (R3
and R4), margins will be larger than needed.  This was the case for the other Maastricht
ratifications, except perhaps for France.
In addition to ratification margins, the most easily observed behavior in this model is
whether the governments successfully negotiate any agreement at all.  No agreement is possible
when the status quo Q lies inside the triangle defined by A, B, and R (see 82 in appendix).  Inside
this triangle, moving Q in any direction will make at least one actor better off while making at
least one actor worse off.  The actor harmed will refuse to negotiate or ratify an agreement on that
point.  As we will see, the “gridlock” conditions are very different in the informal ratification
game.
In summary, the relative positions of the executives, ratifiers, and status quo are critical for3Notice that I am ignoring the role of information transmission by groups, a process
analyzed by Crombez (2002).
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the outcome of the formal ratification game.  All of these conditions depend on the relative
position of the status quo and the three actors in multi-dimensional space.  What matters in the
formal ratification games is the same thing that matters in real estate: location, location, and
location.  The results of the game are often discontinuous and vary significantly on either side of a
threshold.  Behavioral implications appear in the ratification margins as well as whether (and how)
a negotiator responds to the ratifier’s concerns.
Informal ratification: the role of audience costs
Formal ratification often is not required for international agreements to take effect.  When
domestic actors do not have ratification authority, they may try to stop undesirable agreements by
inflicting costs on any government that signs them.  For instance, the farm lobbies in France, the
US, and Japan—none of which have a formal veto over policy—all tried to stop the GATT
Uruguay Round through lobbying, street demonstrations, or campaign contributions (Avery, ed.
1993).  Other groups throughout Europe mobilized over the Maastricht, Amsterdam, or Nice
treaties.  In one way or another, these activities impose some electoral costs on the government.
3
Groups may inflict costs on negotiators directly.  The public also inflicts costs indirectly,
as when a policy lowers public support for the government.  This might occur because the public
can anticipate the likely benefits or costs of a given policy for them (i.e., Gabel 1998) or because
the negotiators have chosen an open process than encourages public participation, as in the
Amsterdam intergovernmental council (Sverdrup 1998) or the European constitutional convention. 
These are "audience costs," to use a term from the study of the effects of domestic politics16
on crisis decision-making and sanctions (Martin 1992; Fearon 1994).  The domestic audience
costs increase as the agreement gets farther away from the domestic actor’s ideal point.  These
costs may be relatively important to the government or relatively unimportant, a factor that we
may capture with a weighting parameter.  These costs are, then, a (linear) function of the distance
between the agreement and the ideal point of each relevant citizen or group. 
Governments also have their own preferences over policy, so the distance between the
agreement and the government's ideal point is also important.  Governments will only accept an
international agreement in their "acceptance set," the set of points that they prefer to the status quo
when they consider both their own policy preferences and the domestic costs of a policy.
In effect, then, a government in the informal ratification game has a “transformed” utility
function in which it considers both its own preferences over policy and a weighting of domestic
groups’ preferences over policy.  For simplicity, I will analyze the case with a single group,
though obviously a country has many groups interested in a given decision.  The government
weights its own policy preferences ", and the group’s preferences (1!"), with " 0 [0, 1].17
Policy is a point xdú
m, with status quo at xQ.
Actors are Governments A and B with ideal points xA, xB, and domestic actor G in A with
ideal point xG .
Utility.  Government A’s utility depends on its own preferences and on the distance between
outcome and the ideal points of that government's public.  I will use a quadratic loss
function for the utility function.
Specifically, for an end of the game outcome E at point xE 0 {w, xQ}, A's utility is
!"[d(xE, xA)]
2 ! (1!")[d(xE, xG)]
2, where " 0 [0, 1] .
B's utility is simply [d(xE, xB)]
2 .
Acceptance sets.   The acceptance set for A, cA, is the set of points that A strictly prefers to
xSQ: cA = {xE: "[d(xE, xA)]
2 + (1!")[d(xE, xG)]
2 < "[d(xQ, xA)]
2 + (1!")[d(xQ, xG)]
2}. 
B’s acceptance set cB = {xE : [d(xE, xB)]
2 < [d(xQ, xB)]
2}.
Stages and Outcomes.  A and B choose a point xN from the win-set w / cA 1 cB. I do not
model how they choose this point.  If w = i, xE = xQ.
The game is complete information and all of the above is common knowledge.
Solution is described in Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
GAME 2:  INFORMAL RATIFICATION
The adjacent box describes this game.  Defining the win-set in this game requires first that
we define the “core,” the set of points that cannot be changed if they are the status quo.  We may
describe the boundaries of the core by finding two lines, the alpha-line and the beta-line.  The
beta-line is simply the projection of B’s ideal point onto the line connecting A’s ideal point with
G’s ideal point.   As drawn in Figure 3, this projection lies inside the ABG triangle, but it could
also lie outside the triangle.
The alpha-line is defined by the fraction ".  The line is perpendicular to the AG line, and
intersects the AG line at a point that is the fraction " from A on the way to G.  This point is also
the point that maximizes A’s transformed utility function.  The points on the alpha line maximize
A’s utility for each imaginary line parallel to the AG line.18
Figure 3
The Core in the Informal Ratification Game
With these definitions in mind, we can now define the core:
Proposition 2.  The core in the informal ratification game is a subset of the triangle
xAxGxB defined by the alpha-line and beta-line.
Specifically, the core is the
shaded area in the adjacent
figure betwen these two
lines.
The logic of this
result rests on the fact that A
and G are no longer distinct
actors who can veto an
agreement that they do not
like.  This veto power is
what prevents change inside
the ABG triangle in the formal ratification game.  Instead, only A and B are actors, though G’s
preferences shape A’s evaluation of any agreement.  If we consider a point in the AB$ triangle,
both A and B would be better off moving this agreement due left onto the beta-line.  Such a
movement is closer to B’s ideal point and also closer to the alpha-line that captures (in a loose
sense) A’s payoff when it consider’s G’s preferences as well.  Similarly, any point in the left-hand
unshaded triangle region could be shifted to the right onto the alpha-line and make both A and B
better off.
Between the alpha-line and the beta-line, any rightward movement making B better off
makes A worse off by moving away from the alpha-line.  Any leftward movement clearly makes19
Figure 4
The Win-Set of the Informal Ratification Game
B worse off.  The points in this trapezoid are therefore Pareto-efficient.  If the status quo lies in
this region it cannot be changed.
We may think of this core as analogous to the contract curve in the formal ratification
game.  As in the formal ratification game, the governments may not prefer all points in the core to
the status quo. This means that 
Proposition 3.  The win-set of the informal ratification game is the intersection of
the core, cA , and cB .
The adjacent figure shows
one such win-set, in which
B’s acceptance set is
constraining.  The result is
shaped like a wedge in this
case, though other more
unusual shapes are also
possible.  I should note here
that A’s transformed win-set
is not circular and is, in fact,
difficult to characterize
visually across the full range of possible ideal points.
This simple example shows the importance of distinguishing formal and informal
ratification.  Under formal ratification, change is impossible if the status quo lies inside the
triangle defined by A, B, and R (82, Appendix).  Under informal ratification, slices of that triangle
are now open to negotiation.  As a result, there are many situations in which no agreement will4The analysis generalizes to n actors; the more ratifiers, the less likely agreement will be. 
This conclusion has been applied to decision-making in the European Union, both formally and
informally; see Moyer 1993; Tsebelis 1994.
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occur under formal ratification and agreement is possible under informal ratification rules. 
Phrased differently, stalemates are more common under formal ratification than informal
ratification.
4
When the status quo Q is close to both A and B, the win-set is highly constrained in both
games.  Neither A nor B will accept much movement in policy, so little movement occurs.  When
the status quo becomes more distant, many point agreements are possible.  As the set of possible
agreements opens up, the procedure matters much more.  When the status quo is so distance that
the governments’ and ratifier’s acceptance sets do not constrain, for example, the win-set is the
entire AB line in the formal ratification game, but a slice of the ABG triangle in the informal
ratification game.  These two win-sets will not normally intersect at all, so that agreements
possible under informal ratification are not equilibria under formal ratification, and vice versa.
Behaviorally, informal ratification games will be characterized by the negotiator “tacking”
in the direction of domestic preferences.  In Figures 3-4 above, for example, government A does
not negotiate along the AB contract curve that we saw in the intergovernmental win-set (Figure 1). 
Instead, A negotiates with B over a set of points that goes part way to satisfying its own domestic
constituencies.
These concessions to domestic interests are continuous, and are a continuous function of
the weighting parameter (") and the distance between the actors.  In the formal ratification game,
once the ratifier will vote for an agreement the negotiators can ignore its preferences.  In contrast,
the informal ratification process continues to impose costs on negotiators if the ratifier’s21
Figure 5
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preferences are not considered.  The informal ratification game also lacks the qualitative change
between types of win-sets found in the formal ratification game.
Finally, the informal
ratification game also lets us
examine the many cases in
which both informal and
formal ratification is found. 
For example, a legislature
may ratify a treaty that the
prime minister negotiates
while backbenchers also
inflict some political cost on
the prime minister for
agreements away from their own ideal point.  For simplicity, assume that the same group has both
formal and informal ratification powers.  Though I will not modify it formally here, clearly this
synthetic game simply adds the ratifier’s constraint—its acceptance set—to the core as defined in
this section.  Figure 5 illustrates this case, with G acting as both formal ratifier and inflicting
audience costs in the informal ratification game.  The win-set is where the circles centered on B
and G intersect with each other and with the shaded region (A’s acceptance set is not constraining
in this case).
Divided government under formal and informal ratification
The continuous nature of change under informal ratification, as opposed to the5The argument parallels the analysis of veto players in domestic politics, especially in
federal, presidential, and/or bicameral polities where several actors must approve any legislation
(Bräuninger and König 1999; Krehbiel 1996; Tsebelis 1995, 1999; Tsebelis and Money 1997).
22
discontinuous and qualitative changes found under formal ratification, shape how these games
work when applied to particular kinds of research problems.  I will illustrate this briefly by
examining the question of “divided government,” which has gained increasing attention within
formal models of two-level theory.  Divided government is the extent to which the executive’s
preferences diverge from the legislature’s preferences in a given country, or in our terms, the
distance between the negotiator’s and ratifier’s ideal points.
The literature has explored two distinct effects of divided government on international
cooperation.  First, increasing divided government can make cooperation more difficult or
impossible because the ratifier will reject treaties that the negotiator favors (i.e., Iida 1993; Milner
1997; Milner and Rosendorff 1997, 1998; Mo 1994, 1995; Schneider and Cedermann 1994; but
Karol 2000).
5  Trying to satisfy an unpredictable legislature under uncertainty may also force an
executive to maintain a hardline stance abroad, preventing cooperation with foreigners (Milner
1997).  In parliamentary systems, anticipated votes of no-confidence may play an analogous role
to treaty ratification (Smith and Hayes 1997). 
The second effect of divided government concerns the distribution of the gains of
cooperation, and goes by the name of the “Schelling Conjecture.” In Strategy and Conflict,
Thomas Schelling (1961: 19-23) conjectured that an executive whose hands were tied would be
able to negotiate more favorable outcomes than an unconstrained executive.  For example, the
president may successfully make demands of Japan in trade negotiations, reminding his
interlocutors that he must satisfy a hardline Congress if any bargain will stick.  A substantial23
formal literature has grown up around this claim (Iida 1993, 1996; Milner and Rosendorff 1997;
Mo 1994, 1995; Pahre 1997; Schneider and Cedermann 1994).   Sophie Meunier (2000) has
argued that the European Union has also received distributive gains from having veto players in
some issue areas.
Whereas the veto player hypothesis addresses the probability of cooperation, the Schelling
Conjecture concerns the distribution of the gains from cooperation.  It therefore has only
conditional validity in the formal ratification game, since it requires that cooperation has in fact
occurred. 
We can analyze the role of divided government within the games of formal and informal
ratification modeled here.  It is now appreciated in the formal ratification game that analysts must
clarify that the effects of divided government depend on the direction of the divisions.  In Figure
2, for example, moving R4 further to the southwest would increase divided government but have
no effect on the game, while moving R3 or R2 to the northeast will increase divided government
and have significant effects on the win-set.  However, in either direction divided government has
no effect beyond some threshold—either the ratifier rejects everything or accepts everything as its
preferences become sufficiently different.
Once again, the informal ratification game is different because the ratifier exhibits
continual pressure on the negotiator.  In any direction, increasing divided government moves the
alpha-line farther away from A’s ideal point and therefore expands the win-set.  Divided
government has unconditional validity in the informal ratification game, unlike the conditional
validity found in the Schelling case.  The government will have to make greater concessions to
satisfy an increasingly distant informal ratifier.
In short, divided government does not affect the probability of cooperation under informal24
ratification, though it often does under formal ratification.  Beyond some threshold, divided
goverment does not affect the distribution of gains under formal ratification, but will always affect
the distribution of gains under informal ratification.  The two forms of ratification differ
dramatically and cannot be lumped together as a single process.
Conclusions
Institutions vary dramatically across nations, across issue areas, and over time.  The
complexity of institutional rules is especially obvious in the European Union.  Rather than
examine this institutional variety, which has been explored elsewhere (i.e., Tsebelis and Garrett
2000), this paper has added the study of uninstitutionalized informal ratification to the two-level
negotiation problem.
Informal ratification is particularly important for the European Union because the public’s
control over policy is particularly indirect if it exists at all, exercised through delegates of
delegates and their delegates.  The Commission, for example, is chosen by the national
governments acting in the European Council, while those national governments are chosen by
national legislatures that are themselves chosen by the electorate.  Neither public nor legislature
has an effective veto over many decisions, and this is one of the features of the EU’s alleged
democratic deficit.  However, legislatures and electorates do have the ability to make their
displeasure known and to impose costs on governments that act contrary to their wishes.
Audience costs may well be the most important—or indeed the only—democratic
constraint available in issue areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy.  CFSP
positions and decisions are negotiated by the Council wthout being subject to formal ratification
by other institutions.  However, foreign policy decisions from Kosovo to Iraq have entailed25
substantial audience costs, and even more narrow joint positions such as voting in the
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) may have costs among a smaller
audience.  These issues have traditionally not played an important role in theorizing about the EU,
especially in contrast to highly-institutionalized procedures such as cooperation or codecision. 
However, the academic debate over intergovernmentalism (Hosli 1993, 1995, 1996; Moravcsik
1996; Moser 1996; Tsebelis 1994, 1996) has hinged on the question of formal rules and not
informal processes.  Bringing informal domestic political processes into the theory enriches
intergovernmentalism while also expanding the theoretical reach of institutionalism.  This agenda
may produce some hypotheses that help us evaluate the relative contributions of
intergovernmentalism and institutionalism for our understanding of the European Union.26
APPENDIX: FORMAL PROPOSITIONS AND PROOFS
FORMAL RATIFICATION.  See Game 1 for structure of the game.
Additional notation.  Define Distinguish the intergovernmental win-set wG (the win-set if there
were no ratifier) and the win-set w.  Note that wG = cA 1 cB 1 xAxB; while a necessary condition
for any xN to be a member of w is that xN 0 {cA 1 cB 1 cR} (w will be the set of points that are
Pareto-efficient for A and B within this set).
Proposition 1.  The solution of the formal ratification game may be described as follows:
(a) if cA 1 cB 1 cR = i, then w = i; 
(b) else if cA 1 cB 1 cR = cA 1 cB, then w = cA 1 cB 1 xAxB;
(c) else if cA 1 cB 1 cR 1 wG … i, then w d wG;
(d) else, then w … i and w 1 wG = i.
Proof.  Each i 0 {A, B, R} must prefer N to SQ, and (1) defines the conditions under which there
is no such N.  If R will ratify all points in wG, as described in (2), then ratification is irrelevant and
w = wG.  If R will ratify some but not all points in wG, as described in (3), then A and B will
choose some point in wG 1 cR; clearly w = wG 1 cR d wG. Note that if A and B were to choose
some xN ó wG, then the projection of xN onto xAxB is Pareto-superior to xN.  When
cA 1 cB 1 cR … i and wG 1 cR = i, then there are ratifiable points that A and B prefer to xSQ but no
such point lies on xAxB.  Thus, A and B choose some xN: xN 0 cR and xN ó wG.~
81.  If xA, xB 0 cR, then ratification is irrelevant.
Proof.  Because R has convex preferences, when xA and xB are in its acceptance set the convex
combination of xA and xB (that is, xAxB) also lies entirely within its acceptance set and will be
ratified.~
82.  If xSQ is in the triangle xAxBxR and on the plane defined by xAxBxR, then no ratifiable
agreement is possible (w = i).
Proof.  This triangle defines the simplex of Pareto-efficient points for A, B and R, such that any
agreement increasing the utility of both A and B must by definition reduce R's utility.~
INFORMAL RATIFICATION.
Notation.  I will treat any point xi as a vector in n-dimensional space [xi1, xi2, xi3, . . . , xin], or for
simplicity [xi].
83.  A’s utility is at a maximum at [xM] = [xA]+(1-") [xG].
Proof.  Define a line L with origin at xA through xG and scaled such that xG = 1.  The point
[xM] must lie on L in the interval [0,1] because for any other point x* there is a projection of x*
onto L that reduces both d(x*, xA) and d(x*, xG) and therefore increases UA ; if that projection xP
lies outside [0,1], then either xA or xG will reduce both xA and xG , again increasing UA .  A’s utility
for any point x on L in [0,1] is UA = !"x
2 !(1!")(1!x)
2.  This function is at a maximum at
(1!"), which we may also describe as [xA]+(1-") [xG].~27
84.  The points inside the triangle xAxGxB are Pareto-efficient.
Proof.  For any point x outside xAxGxB there is a projection xP of x onto one of the three line
segments bounding xAxGxB such that d(xP, xi) < d(x, xi)  œi 0 {A, G, B}; therefore UA(xP)>UA(x)
and UB(xP)>UB(x).~
85.  On the xAxGxB plane, the set of points off the line xAxG that maximize UA is described by the
line perpendicular to xAxG through (1!") =  [xA]+(1-") [xG]. (Define this as the alpha-line.)
Proof.  Define a line Y parallel to L at distance y.  Let xY be the point on Y that maximizes UA
Z be the projection of xY onto L.  Define z = d(xZ, xA) and therefore (1!z) = d(xZ, xG). 
This means that d(xY, xA) = sqrt(z² + y²) and d(xY, xG) = sqrt((1!z)² + y²), so that
UA = (z² + y²) + (1!z)² + y²).  The function UA is at a maximum when z = (1!").~
Definition.  The beta-line is the line connecting xB with xB*, the projection of xB onto the line
xAxG .
86.  Any point outside the space defined by alpha-line and beta-line and inside the triangle xAxGxB
is not Pareto-efficient.
Proof.  Any point x* inside the triangle xAxGxB defines a line Y*.  Points on Y* between the
alpha-line and beta-line are Pareto-efficient because movement toward the alpha-line implies
movement away from the beta-line, which necessarily increases the distance to xB , while
movement on Y* toward the beta-line implies movement away from the alpha-line and therefore
reduces A’s utility.   If x* is outside these lines, movement toward both lines raises A’s and B’s
utility simultaneously.~
Definition.  The core is the set of points that cannot be changed if they are the status quo.
Proposition 2.  The core in the informal ratification game is a subset of the triangle xAxGxB
defined by the alpha-line and beta-line.
Proof follows from the above lemmas.~
Proposition 3.  The win-set of the informal ratification game is the intersection of the core, cA ,
and cB .
Proof follows from Proposition 2 and the definition of acceptance sets.~28
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